Decoupled communication, which requires no direct association between the producers of information and its consumers-as under the publish/subscribe (P/S) middleware -is often useful for the integration of distributed and heterogeneous applications. But the indefinite, and potentially global, reach of decoupled communication-the very reason for its power-has a dark side, which may complicate the system using it, making it less predictable, more brittle, and less safe. Just think about the effect of shouting "fire" in a packed theatre, particularly, but not only, if it is a false alarm.
Introduction
The issue addressed in this paper is that of communication in large heterogeneous distributed systems, under which, the communicators may not know the location, identity, or even the presence, of those they communicate with. Among several techniques that have been developed to support such communication-which effectively decouples the producers of information from its consumers, both in time and in space [6] -the most prominent are: the publish/subscribe (P/S, for short) [7, 15] , and the Linda-like tuple-space [5, 13] middlewares. The publish/subscribe paradigm, which we will take here as a representative of what enables decoupled communication, provides mediators between the producers of information (which we call here informers), and its consumers (the clients, or subscribers). Under this paradigm, when an informer has some information to impart, it sends We will also show that the proposed regulatory mechanism, which is entirely decentralized, is more scalable than the centralized access-control built into the P/S mediator, and that it can better protect the mediator from abuse by careless or buggy users. Finally, we will demonstrate that our regulatory mechanism is more powerful than the mediator-based alternative, in particular, in that it is able to: (a) impose obligations on the informers, or on the recipients, of certain event-notices; and (b) ensure the qualification of the mediators themselves.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a study of the nature of regulation that may be required over decoupled communication, using the treatment of alarms within a hospital as a case in point. Section 3 is an overview of law-Governed Interaction (LGI)-the computation mechanism on which this paper is based. In Section 4 we show how our example alarm policy of Section 2 is formulated, and scalably enforced under LGI. In Section 5 we consider the performance of our control mechanism; and we conclude in Section 6.
An Institutional Alarm Policy-a Motivating Example
We start this section with an elaboration on the alarm example introduced above, by stipulating a detailed policy for the treatment of alarms within a large hospital. We will then argue that this policy cannot be implemented effectively by P/S mediators alone, requiring a degree of control over the community of users of the P/S services.
An alarm policy for a hospital
Before we present the policy itself, some comments about our assumptions and terminology are in order. First, we will distinguish between various kinds of alarms, for emergencies such as: fire, low level of blood supply, etc.-assuming, for simplicity, that the sets of alarms of different kinds are disjoint. Alarms of kind K are called K-alarms. Second, we assume that for each kind K of emergency, there are some designated experts, called K-experts, who take the primary responsibility for recognizing the occurrence of this emergency, and for dealing with the associated alarms. Agents that are not thus designated as experts, on a given type of emergency, are called laymen with respect to it.
Third, we recognize certain roles that various agents may play in this context. These include: (a) P/S servers, also called mediators; (b) the above mentioned experts on various kinds of emergencies and alarms; (c) K-inspectors, who have special responsibility with respect to K-alarms, to be discussed below; (d) a facility manager, whose function is to regulate dynamically various aspects of the system, as we shall see; and (e) a certification authority (CA) called admin, whose certification would be required for the authentication of most of the above roles.
Fourth, we assume all alarms to have the following form:
alarm(kind(K), time(T), informer(I), status(S), text(X))
where, K is the kind of the alarm; T marks the time when this alarm was raised; I identifies the informer who has raised this alarm; S specifies the status of this informer-either expert or layman-with respect to the current alarm kind K; and, finally, X is the text describing the specific alarm. Finally, regarding subscriptions to alarms, we consider here, for simplicity, only exact matching with a specified list of attribute values; e.g., subscription to
alarm([kind(fire), status(expert)])
means to capture all fire alarms published by experts.
We now introduce a detailed example of an alarm policy for a hospital, to be called simply AP . The statement of this policy is followed by a discussion of its rationale. Rationale: Point 1 of this policy requires the holders of a role-such as a facility manager, an expert on alarms of a specific kind, and, in particular, the P/S mediator-certify themselves via the specified CA. In other words, such certification process reflects the organizational decision as to which agents should play these roles. The certification of mediators, and the requirement of Point 2 that only mediators thus certified be used for the dissemination of alarms, provide some assurance of the quality and trustworthiness of the mediators. This is, in part, a way to deal with concerns such as confidentiality of information handled by the P/S mediators, raised by [19] . Point 3 is concerned with the distinction between experts and laymen. The reason for this distinction is that a widely disseminated alarm can be as dangerous as shouting "fire!" in a crowded theatre. Therefore, this policy limits the ability to make such alarms to those who are certified as "experts," and presumably able to recognize a true emergency condition that requires the raising of an (real) alarm. Of course, an emergency condition may be first observed by a layman, which is why laymen are allowed to raise alarms. But because laymen's alarms are not very trustworthy, they are visible only by the appropriate experts, who can examine the situation and, if necessary, issue an alarm to the entire client base.
The role of inspector is introduced, by Point 5, in an attempt to ensure that there are some responsible agents that listen to all laymen's alarms, and in a timely fashion. This assurance, which is, of course, not absolute, is achieved as follows. First, once a K-inspector is appointed by a certified facility manager, he is obliged, by Point 5a, to subscribe to all K-alarms, so that no such alarms would be left unseen. Second he is expected, by Point 5b, to send a copy of each such alarm to the facility manager, serving here as an auditor, as a proof that he actually noticed it. Third, if such a copy is not sent within a specified deadline-perhaps because this inspector is not attentive, or is disconnected-then, by Point 5c, an appropriate metaAlarm is to be raised automatically, in the hope that it will be picked up by the metaAlarm-inspector, or by some other expert on such alarms. We believe such monitoring of responses to certain publications is often essential for the reliability of the system composed of potentially unreliable components.
Finally, Point 4 is an attempt to protect the P/S mediator from large numbers of unnecessary alarms-which might be issued by an overzealous, or faulty, layman. This is done by: (a) limiting the frequency of publishing repeated alarms by every layman; and (b) by allowing the facilitymanager to prevent certain laymen from publishing alarms altogether.
On the communal nature of policy AP
We explain here our contention that policy AP -and other such policies, by implication-is inherently communal, governing the entire community involved with alarms, and that it does not lend itself to effective implementation by P/S mediators alone. This contention has several reasons.
First, the mediators (or P/S servers) cannot ensure by themselves that publish and subscribe messages are sent only to servers duly certified as mediators, as required by Point 2. This, clearly, requires a degree of control over the operation of the agents that publish and subscribe, not allowing them to use uncertified servers.
Second, Point 4 of policy AP limits the frequency of alarms from any layman. As we already pointed out, the purpose of this provision is to reduce congestion on the mediators by protecting them from overzealous alarmists, which may be in a loop sending thousands of alarm notices. This purpose cannot be achieved if the mediator itself has to enforce policy AP , because it might still be congested, just by having to receive, and then reject, all such useless alarms.
Third, besides the client/server interactions between the users and the mediators, the regulation of policy AP ranges also over some interactions between users themselves. This is the case, in particular, for the assignment of K-inspectors for duty, which, under Point 5, is carried out by messages from facility managers to the agents in question. Such messages do not involve the mediators, which are, therefore, in no position to regulate them.
It is, of course, possible to require the assignment messages from managers be sent via the mediator, which would then be able to regulate them. But this is undesirable for two reasons: First, such message traffic might constitute a relatively large increase in the number of messages that the mediator has to process. Relatively large, because the assignment of agents to various duties is a routine matter of administration, which is likely to be much more frequent than alarms. Given such large background traffic, the mediator may not be able to react rapidly enough to emergency situation. Secondly, and more importantly, organizational activities, such as the assignment of inspectors for duty, are orthogonal to the functionality of the P/S mediator-efficiently disseminating event-notices to matching subscribers. Attempting to couple these functionalities together would complicate the mediator, and make it less efficient, and less secure. Note further that, as seen immediately below, the scope of the regulation over such organizational activities is not just restricted to the maintenance of roles that are used to render access permissions, as is the case with traditional access-control.
Finally, requirements concerning the behavior of K-inspectors, imposed by Point 5, are not, by and large, suitable for implementation via the P/S mediator. First, Point 5a requires the obligation of every K-inspector to subscribe to all K-alarms be fulfilled. Second, Point 5b implies a requirement that each K-inspector be monitored for his acknowledgement of the receipt of every K-alarm issued by a layman. Finally, Point 5c requires a K-inspector's failure to fulfill such duty result in the publication of a suitable meta-alarm. In essence, these points require an enforcement mechanism that (a) maintains the status of communication between users (not necessarily involving the mediator), and (b) fulfills the obligation to publish, or to subscribe to, a specified event-notice based on such status-which are, again, largely orthogonal to the core functionality of P/S service.
In conclusion, we argue that a policy like AP , which regulates alarms within a hospital, represents one of possibly many administrative aspects of the hospital that are inextricably intertwined with its general operation at large; thus, the implementation of such a policy does not really belong to the P/S mediator-a means of transporting event-notices. Moreover, as seen above, some provisions of policy AP just do not lend themselves to effective implementation by the P/S mediators. Indeed, none of the existing P/S services can handle the entire scope of policy AP . In Section 4 we will show how policy AP can be formulated and enforced in a decentralized, communal manner, with only marginal involvement of the P/S mediator.
Law-Governed Interaction (LGI)-an Overview
Broadly speaking, LGI [12] is a message-exchange mechanism that allows an open group of distributed agents to engage in a mode of interaction governed by an explicitly specified policy, called the interaction-law (or simply the "law") of the group. The messages thus exchanged under a given law L are called L-messages, and the group of agents interacting via L-messages is called an L-community C L (or, simply, a community C) .
We refer to entities that participate in an L-community as agents 2 , by which we mean autonomous actors that can interact with each other, and with their environment. An agent might be an encapsulated software entity, with its own state and thread of control, or a human that interacts with the system via some interface. A community under LGI is open in the following sense: (a) its membership can change dynamically, and can be very large; and (b) its members can be heterogeneous. For more details about LGI than provided by this overview, the reader is referred to [14, 1, 2] .
On the nature of LGI laws, and their decentralized enforcement
The function of an LGI law L is to regulate the exchange of L-messages between members of a community C L . Such regulation may involve (a) restriction of the kind of messages that can be exchanged between various members of C L , which is the traditional function of access-control policies; (b) transformation of certain messages, possibly rerouting them to different destinations; and (c) causing certain messages to be emitted spontaneously, under specified circumstances, via a mechanism we call obligations.
A crucial feature of LGI is that its laws can be stateful. That is, a law L can be sensitive to the dynamically changing state of the interaction among members of C L , where by "state" we mean some function of the history of this interaction, called the control-state (CS) of the community. The dependency of this control-state on the history of interaction is defined by the law L itself.
But the most salient and unconventional aspects of LGI laws are their strictly local formulation, and the decentralized nature of their enforcement. To motivate these aspects of LGI we start with an outline of a centralized treatment of interaction-laws in distributed systems. Finding this treatment unscalable, we will show how it can be decentralized.
On a centralized enforcement of interaction laws:
Suppose that the exchange of Lmessages between the members of a given community C L is mediated by a reference monitor T , which is trusted by all of them. Let T consist of the following three parts: (a) the law L of this community, written in a given language for writing laws; (b) a generic law enforcer E, built to interpret any well formed law written in the given law-language, and to carry out its rulings; and (c) the control-state (CS) of community C L (see Figure 2 (a)). The structure of the control-state, and its effect on the exchange of messages between members of C L are both determined by law L.
This straightforward mechanism provides for very expressive laws. The central reference monitor T has access to the entire history of interaction within the community in question. And a law can be written to maintain any function of this history as the control-state of the community, which may have any desired effect on the interaction between community members. Unfortunately, this mechanism is inherently unscalable, as it can become a bottleneck, when serving a large community, and a dangerous single point of failure.
Moreover, when dealing with stateful policies, these drawbacks of centralization cannot be easily alleviated by replicating the reference monitor T , as it is done in the Tivoli system [10] , for example. The problem, in a nutshell, is that if there are several replicas of T , then any change in CS would have to be carried out synchronously at all the replicas. Such maintenance of consistency between replicas is very time consuming, and is quite unscalable with respect to the number of replicas of T .
Fortunately, as we shall see below, law enforcement can be genuinely decentralized, and carried out by a distributed set {T x | x ∈ C} of, what we call, controllers, one for each member of community C (see Figure 2 (b)). Unlike the central reference monitor T above, which carries the CS of the entire community, controller T x carries only the local control-state CS x of x-where CS x is some function, defined by law L, of the history of communication between x and the rest of the L-community. In other words, changes of CS x are strictly local, not having to be correlated with the control-states of other members of the L-community. However, such decentralization of enforcement requires the laws themselves to be local, in a sense to be defined next.
The local nature of LGI laws: An LGI law is defined over a certain types of events occurring at members of a community C subject to it, mandating the effect that any such event should have. Such a mandate is called the ruling of the law for the given event. The events subject to laws, called regulated events, include (among others): the sending and the arrival of an L-message; the occurrence of an exception; and the coming due of an obligation. The operations that can be included in the ruling for a given regulated event, called primitive operations, are all local with respect to the agent at which the event occurred (called, the "home agent"). They include: operations on the control-state of the home agent; operations on messages, such as forward and deliver; and the imposition of an obligation on the home agent.
To summarize, an LGI law must satisfy the following locality properties: (a) a law can regulate explicitly only local events at individual agents; (b) the ruling for an event e at agent x can depend only on e itself, and on the local control-state CS x ; and (c) the ruling for an event that occurs at x can mandate only local operations to be carried out at x.
Decentralization of law-enforcement: As has been pointed out, we replace the central reference monitor T with a distributed set {T x | x ∈ C} of controllers, one for each member of community C. Structurally, all these controllers are generic, with the same law-enforcer E, and all must be trusted to interpret correctly any law they might operate under. When serving members of community C L , however, they all carry the same law L. And each controller T x associated with an agent x of this community carries only the local control-state CS x of x, while every L-message exchanged between a pair of agents x and y passes through a pair of controllers, T x and T y (see Figure 2 (b)). Due to the local nature of LGI laws, each controller T x can handle events that occur at its client x strictly locally, with no explicit dependency on anything that might be happening with other members in the community. It should also be pointed out that controller T x handles the events at x strictly sequentially, in the order of their occurrence, and atomically. This, with the locality of laws, greatly simplifies the structure of the controllers, making them easier to use as our trusted computing base (TCB).
The deployment of LGI
The mechanism of LGI, and particularly that of controllers as the law-enforcer, has been implemented (in Java) as a messaging middleware called Moses. Thus, all one needs for the deployment of LGI is the availability of a set of such trustworthy controllers, which run as distinct processes from each other, and from any clients, and a way for a prospective client to locate a running controller. For this purpose, we have also implemented a controller-service to maintain a set of controllers, as part of Moses.
For an agent x to engage in LGI communication under a law L, after locating a controller via a controller-service, it needs to supply this controller with the law L it wants to employ, via specifying the text of L or its URL. The controller then checks if law L is well-formed, and if so, it starts to serve for this client. Only through this hand-shake between a controller and an agent-a procedure called adoption of law L-the agent can start to participate in L-community C L , becoming able to interact with other members. All these kinds of communication between an agent and its controller, including ones mentioned below, are facilitated by a Moses API. A graphical user interface is also provided for human users.
Note that it is quite possible for a single agent, x, to adopt the same law L more than once, whether connecting to a single controller or multiple controllers. In such a case, however, each adoption results in a distinct membership of x in C L , and x participates in this community, representing in effect multiple members. That is, each such membership of x is associated with its own control-state, with respect to which, the locality of the law is strictly preserved. In an application where tighter membership control is necessary, one can choose to deploy a secretary of the community, as explained in [17] .
Once x has adopted law L, it may need to distinguish itself as playing a certain role, etc., which would provide it with some distinct privileges under law L. One can do this by presenting certain digital certificates to the controller, as explained in [1] . A simple illustration of such certification is provided by our example law AP in Section 4, under which one may claim the role of a facility manager, for example.
Finally, we point out that the LGI model is silent on the placement of controllers vis-a-vis the agents they serve, and it allows for the sharing of a single controller by several agents. This provides flexibilities, which can be used to minimize the overhead of LGI under various conditions, as shown in [14] .
The basis for trust between members of a community
Note that we do not propose to coerce any agent to exchange L-messages under any given law L. The role of enforcement here is merely to ensure that any exchange of L-messages, once undertaken, conforms to law L. In particular, our enforcement mechanism needs to ensure that a message received under law L has been sent under the same law; i.e., that it is not possible to forge Lmessages. For this, one needs the following assurances: (a) that the exchange of L-messages is mediated by correctly implemented controllers; (b) that these controllers are interpreting the same law L; and (c) that L-messages are securely transmitted over the network.
Broadly speaking, these assurances are provided as follows. Controllers used for mediating the exchange of L-messages authenticate themselves to each other via certificates signed by a CA specified by law L, as we will see in Section 4. (Note that different laws may, thus, require different certification levels for the controllers used for its enforcement.) This authority is an important element of the trust between agents that exchange such messages. Messages sent across the network must be digitally signed by the sending controller, and the signature must be verified by the receiving controller. To ensure that a message forwarded by a controller T x under law L would be handled by another controller T y operating under the same law, T x appends a one-way hash [16] H of law L to the message it forwards to T y . T y would accept this as a valid L-message under L if and only if H is identical to the hash of its own law. (Thus, how members x and y get the text of law L is actually irrelevant to the assurance that both operate under the same law, although, for convenience, we have provided an HTTP-based law-server that provides agents with a library of laws.)
Finally, note that although we do not compel anybody to operate under any particular law, or to use LGI, for that matter, one may be effectively compelled to exchange L-messages, if one needs to communicate with others that operate only under this law. For instance, given law AP introduced in Section 4, if the community of users of the P/S services are committed to publish and subscribe via AP-messages, then the mediator will have to operate under law AP as well, if it is to be able to serve them-and will thus be required to authenticate itself as prescribed by this law. Conversely, once the mediator commits itself to using AP-messages (which is expected to be part of what qualifies a certified mediator, in implementing Points 1 and 2 of policy AP in Section 2), its users would be effectively compelled to do their publishing and subscription via AP-messages as well. This is probably the best one can do in the distributed context, where it is impossible to ensure that all relevant messages are mediated by a reference monitor, or by any set of such monitors.
Implementation of the Alarm Policy
We now demonstrate our mechanism to regulate decoupled communication by introducing law AP, which is the implementation, under LGI, of policy AP discussed in Section 2. We start with some general remarks on the deployment of a law.
To begin with, of course, the actual text of the law has to be stipulated.
LGI currently supports two languages for writing laws: (a) a Prolog-like language, introduced in [12] , and (b) a restricted version of Java, described in [18] . The former of these languages is employed below. We envision that such stipulation is done by a group of pertinent stake-holders, including, in our example, the administrators of this hospital, and the representatives of other users, with the help of computational specialists. In particular, this is the time when the communal decision is made as to which (kinds of) agents (can) play which roles in the interaction, including the choice of trustworthy CA. As a consequence, one needs to ensure that necessary certificates, in our example, for the mediator, the facility manager, and for K-experts of various K, are issued by the chosen CA and possessed by the intended agents, in order for them to claim the role. Note that the community under the current law may reuse the previously issued certificates, if they fit the current purposes.
Once law L is stipulated, it should be made available to agents that may participate in community C L . As explained in Section 3.3, the trustworthiness of communal interaction is immune to how the actual text of L is distributed; e.g., one may send it in an e-mail to his peers, to be used for its adoption by each of them. If a trustworthy HTTP server is available, one can use it to store the text, to have it retrieved by the controller during the adoption of L. As mentioned before, we also provide an HTTP-based law-server as part of the Moses middleware.
So far, we have assumed that the P/S mediator to be deployed is implemented as a single process. However, this is only for the sake of simplicity of presentation. In fact, our regulatory mechanism applies to a P/S mediator consisting of multiple, distributed processes, working in concert, just as well. 3 Particularly, no change in law AP below would be required to regulate the use of such a P/S mediator of a distributed architecture. This is because our regulation is applied only to the communication between the mediator and its users, not between the distributed mediator processes that make up the entire P/S service. Note that, in such a case, however, each mediator process has to adopt law AP, and to present a certificate, attesting its mediator role, as a single-process mediator would, which will be explained shortly.
Law AP to regulate alarms
Law AP, displayed in Figures 3 and 4 , consists of two parts: the preamble and the rule section. The preamble gives this law its name, ap. It also contains the following clauses: First there is the cAuthority clause that identifies the public key of the CA to be used for the authentication of the controllers that are to mediate AP-messages, as described in Section 3.3. Second, there is an authority clause that identifies admin, represented by its public key, as a CA for certifying various roles played in this community. Finally, the initialCS clause defines the initial control-state of all agents in this community-it is empty in this case.
Preamble: law(ap). cAuthority(publicKeyOfCAuth). authority(admin, publicKeyOfAdmin). initialCS([]).

R1. certified([issuer(admin),subject(Self),attributes([role(R)])])
:-(R=mediator; R=facilityManager; R=expert(K)), do(+R).
Given an appropriate certificate from admin, a term is inserted to represent the corresponding role.
R2. sent(C, subscribe(alarm(AL)), M) :-member(kind(K),AL), (expert(K)@CS -> AL1=AL
; delete(AL,status(layman),AL2), append(AL2,[status(expert)],AL1)), (K=metaAlarm -> expert(K)@CS ; true), do(forward(C,subscribe(alarm(AL1)),M)).
Regulating subscription to alarms: laymen can subscribe to alarms published by experts, and only experts can subscribe to metaAlarm.
R3. sent(I, publish(alarm(kind(K),text(X))), M) :-clock(T)@CS, (expert(K)@CS -> S=expert ; S=layman, not(blocked(K)@CS), not(blocked(kind(K),text(X))@CS)), A=alarm(kind(K),time(T),informer(I),status(S),text(X)), do(forward(I, publish(A), M)), (S=layman -> do(+blocked(kind(K),text(X))), do(imposeObligation(releaseBlock(kind(K),text(X)),5,min)) ; true).
Regulating publishing of alarms.
R4. arrived(C, Msg, M) :-(Msg=subscribe(A); Msg=publish(A)), mediator@CS, do(deliver).
A mediator can receive subscriptions and publications.
R5. sent(M, notify(A), Cs) :-mediator@CS, do(multicast(M, Msg, Cs)).
A mediator can notify clients.
R6. arrived(M, notify(A), U) :-A=alarm(kind(K),time(T),informer(I),status(S),text(X))
, (S=layman -> expert(K)@CS; true), (inspector(K)@CS, S=layman -> imposeObligation(handlingExpire(A,med(M)),10,min) ; true), do(deliver).
An alarm propagated by a mediator is delivered, but a layman does not get an alarm published by another layman.
R7. obligationDue(releaseBlock(kind(K),text(X))) :-do(-blocked(kind(K),text(X))).
The blocked term to control the frequency of publishing is removed when the specified amount of time passes.
Figure 3: Law AP
The rest of the law consists of a set of rules, in a Prolog-like syntax. Most rules are followed by a comment (in italic), which, together with our discussion, should be understandable even for a reader not well versed in the LGI language for writing laws. Each rule has a head, to the left of symbol :-, and a body, to its right. Recall that the same law is interpreted individually by the controller associated to each agent in the community. A regulated event occurring at this home agent, as explained in Section 3.1, triggers a rule that has a matching head, if any (the matching is done in the order in which the rules are written). The triggered rule proceeds to check if all the goals in its body are attained, given the control-state of this agent.
In addition to the standard types of Prolog goals, the body of a rule may contain two distinguished types of goals. These are the sensor-goals, which allow the law to "sense" the control-state of the home agent, and the do-goals that contribute to the ruling of the law. A sensor-goal has the form t@CS, where t is any Prolog term. It attempts to unify t with each term in the control-state of the home agent. A do-goal, which always succeeds, has the form do(p), where p is one of the primitive operations, mentioned in Section 3.1. It appends the term, p, to the ruling of the law. Thus, successful evaluation of a rule body with do-goals leads to a non-empty ruling, and the execution of the primitive operations therein. In what follows, we may speak of this effect as if the said rule itself were to execute the pertinent operations. (By default, an empty ruling implies that the event in question has no consequences-such an event is effectively ignored.)
Rule R1 permits an agent to undertake some designated role by presenting an appropriate certificate issued by admin. As stipulated in Point 1 of policy AP , the roles regulated here are: (a) a P/S mediator; (b) a facility manager; and (c) an expert on K-alarms. The certified event that triggers this rule is generated when the controller is presented with a valid certificate, i.e., duly signed by an authority declared in an authority clause, in this case admin. 4 The certified event has as its argument the following representation of the submitted certificate:
[issuer(admin), subject(Self), attributes(role(R))].
Term issuer(admin) tells about the issuer of the certificate, while subject(Self) is used to signify the subject of the certification. Self is an LGI built-in variable that is bound to the identifier 5 of the home agent, which means that this certified event is generated when the home agent presents a self-certificate to its controller. Term attributes above describes what is certified about the subject, and in this case asserts that the agent is qualified for the role bound to R (which should be one of the three mentioned above). Thus, the rule inserts the binding of R into the control state, treated as the token of the certification in the rest of the law.
Rules R2 through R6 are central to the regulation over the interaction between P/S mediators and other members of the community. Rule R2 is triggered when an agent, whose identifier is bound to C, sends its controller a subscription message, addressed to the intended mediator, whose identifier is bound to M. This rule allows any agent to subscribe to alarms of some kind with optional properties. However, the subscription of a layman is examined, and possibly transformed in the ruling, to implement Point 3; i.e., a layman may not receive an alarm published by another layman. This is done as follows: The law accepts a message of the form subscribe(alarm(AL)) where AL is a list of attribute criteria of subscription, e.g., [kind(fire)]. The rule checks if the agent is an expert on alarms of kind K, specified in the message, by testing the presence of term expert(K) in the control state. 6 If so, the subscription is forwarded to the mediator with no change. Otherwise, the agent is a layman, and status(expert) is placed into the attribute criteria, while all occurrences of status(layman), if any, being deleted. When this transformed subscription is forwarded to the mediator, it effectively constrains the subscribed alarms to be issued only by experts. R2 also denies a layman's attempt to subscribe to alarms of kind metaAlarm, by requiring the home agent to be a metaAlarm-expert, which partially fulfills Point 5c.
Rule R3 regulates the publishing of an alarm. Given kind K of the alarm and its description X in the message sent by the agent, this rule adds the following properties before forwarding it to the mediator: (1) identifier I of the informer; (2) status S, either expert or layman depending on the informer being a K-expert; and (3) the current time. This ensures the authenticity of the alarm in general, and the informer's status in particular, on which the enforcement of Points 3 and 5b directly relies.
When a message to subscribe to alarms, or to publish an alarm, arrives at the controller of the addressed mediator, the corresponding arrived event is generated, which is handled by rule R4. (Hereafter, we may simply say such a message is, upon its arrival at the agent, handled by the relevant rule.) Note in this rule (and in the next), another LGI built-in variable Msg is used that carries the entire regulated message. After ensuring the legitimacy of the mediator, the rule delivers the message to it. In parallel, rule R5 permits a certified mediator to notify clients that (supposedly) have a matching subscription to a given published alarm. Note multicast is another primitive operation; it forwards the given message to a set of recipients, specified in its third argument. Combined, R4 and R5 implement Point 2.
Once an event-notice propagated by a mediator arrives at each selected subscriber, it is handled by rule R6. This rule ensures that (even under a "faulty" mediator) a layman does not get a Kalarm published by another layman (Point 3), by requiring the recipient to be a K-expert, if it was published by a layman.
The frequency restriction on laymen's publishing, as stipulated in Point 4, is implemented as follows: A term, blocked(kind(K),text(X)), is inserted into the layman's control state by rule R3 when it publishes a corresponding K-alarm. Rule R3 also imposes an LGI obligation releaseBlock, specifying it to come due in 5 minutes, which is handled by rule R7, to remove the blocked term above. Thus, rule R3, by requiring such a blocked term be absent, prevents a layman from publishing the same alarm for the specified duration of time.
Rule R8 allows for a facility manger to send a message to assign an inspector of alarms of some kind on duty (Point 5). The arrival of such a message triggers rule R9, which checks if the recipient is a K-expert, before inserting term inspector(K). In addition, rule R9 implements Point 5a by forwarding subscription to all K-alarms on behalf of this appointed K-inspector.
Rules R10 and R11 implement the remainder of Point 4, which allows a facility manager to block a layman from publishing altogether. Rule R11 ensures that it is not an expert that is blocked, and inserts a term, blocked(K), whose absence is required by rule R3 for a layman's publication to be forwarded to the mediator.
As stipulated in Point 5b, each K-inspector should promptly examine every alarm issued by a layman. Rule R12 allows such an inspector to send a copy of the alarm to the facility manager, as a proof of noticing it. This rule ensures that the correct identifier of the facility manager is used in the message, by matching it to the one kept in the fm(FM) term, which was inserted by rule R9 when the appointment message arrived. Upon the arrival of such an acknowledgement, rule R13 delivers the message to the facility manager.
Finally, (the remainder of) Point 5c, and what is inferred from Point 5b as well, is implemented as follows. Upon a K-inspector receiving a layman's alarm, rule R6 imposes an obligation called handlingExpire(A,med(M)) where A is the representation of the entire alarm, and M is the mediator that has propagated the alarm to the inspector. This obligation is set to come due in 10 minutes. If this K-inspector acknowledges the alarm in time, specifically by sending its copy to the
R8. sent(FM, inspectorOnDuty(kind(K),med(M)), X) :-facilityManager@CS, do(forward).
A facility manager can send message to put an inspector on duty.
R9. arrived(FM, inspectorOnDuty(kind(K),med(M)), X)
:
A K-expert can be appointed as a K-inspector, who is obliged to subscribe to all K-alarms.
R10. sent(FM, blockLay(K), L) :-facilityManager@CS, do(forward).
A facility manager can block a layman from publishing.
R11. arrived(FM, blockLay(K), L) :-not(expert(K)@CS), do(+blocked(K)), do(deliver).
A block message causes the corresponding term to be inserted.
R12
. sent(I, ack(A), FM) :-fm(FM)@CS, Obl=handlingExpire(A,med(M)), obligation(Obl)@CS, do(repealObligation(Obl)), do(deliver).
An inspector can acknowledge a layman's alarm to the facility manager.
R13. arrived(I, ack(A), FM) :-facilityManager@CS,do(deliver).
R14. obligationDue(handlingExpire(A,med(M))) :-clock(T)@CS, do(forward(Self, publish(alarm(kind(metaAlarm),time(T),informer(Self), status(layman),text(unack(A)))), M)).
If an alarm received from a laymen is not acknowledged by the inspector, a metaAlarm is published.
Figure 4: Law AP (continued) facility manager, handled by R12 as seen above, the obligation that has been imposed is repealed. Otherwise, when the obligation comes due, by rule R14, the corresponding metaAlarm is sent to the mediator for publication, carrying the unacknowledged alarm and the identifier of this K-inspector in two attributes, text and informer, respectively.
On the Performance of Proposed Mechanism
Concentrating only on the access-control aspect of the proposed mechanism, we compare its performance to that of what can be implemented by the P/S mediators themselves. Our measurement of the most recent implementation of LGI controller shows that each regulated event is processed in about 0.6 ms, on a Sun Fire 280R, UltraSPARC-III server (900 MHz), under Solaris 2.8 operating system and Java 1.3. (Note that this version still does not incorporate the improvement measures suggested previously in [14] .) The general picture that emerges below is as follows: Our mechanism tends to decrease the load on the mediator (in some cases dramatically), reducing the probability of congestion, and to increase the mediator's throughput, but it involves modest increase in latency, when the mediator is not congested. Note that in this section the analyses and the experiment are based on a single-process mediator. Under a multiple-process, distributed mediator, assuming that the number of clients per mediator node and the frequency of access requests are the same as those of the single-process mediator, the general picture mentioned above should remain qualitatively the same. One notable difference would be that, as the cost of the event-notice routing, which our mechanism would not affect, becomes the dominating factor of the latency, the overhead on the latency caused by our mechanism should decrease accordingly.
Load on the mediator
Our proposed mechanism tends to reduce the load on the mediator, that is, the number of messages received by it, for two reasons.
First, certain messages would be blocked at the periphery by the controllers associated with users ( Figure 5 ). For example, due to rule R3, implementing policy point 4, if a layman tries to publish the same alarm too frequently, it will be blocked. This is particularly effective in blocking buggy or careless users from bombarding the mediator with a large number of messages, as demonstrated in Section 5.2. On the other hand, a mediator-based implementation is vulnerable to such unruly users, who can cause the denial of service to the entire community. The second factor that can affect the load on the mediator has to do with the maintenance of the status of users, which is relevant to the policy at hand. For example, our AP policy is sensitive to the appointment of an agent as an inspector. Under the proposed communal mechanism, such appointment is carried out by exchanging messages between the users themselves, not involving the mediator. On the other hand, in the mediator-based approach, any change of status relevant to the policy at hand needs to be communicated to the mediator, and thus increases the load on it. This increase might be relatively significant because it is caused by routine interaction between users, which might be much more frequent than alarms that reflect exceptional circumstances. Note that even if certificates are used to establish access rights "off-line," the mediator itself, rather than the periphery, still has to grant (or deny) each access, and it must be made aware of the loss of such rights (e.g., due to the revocation of certificates).
Congestion caused by unruly informers
We have conducted an experiment that measures the effect of an unruly informer on the performance of P/S services, under (a) the mediator-based access-control, and (b) the proposed decentralized mechanism. The two configurations used in this experiment are depicted in Figure 6 . They both operate under a policy that limits the frequency of publication allowed to any one agent to ten per second. (Of course, this frequency is set well below the threshold to cause congestion to the particular mediator we used.)
In both configurations, essentially the same mediator M is used. In either configuration, one thread of M each handles the in-coming requests from another process, and deposits them in a single queue of M . The processing of user requests, including sending each event-notice to the target subscriber(s), is implemented as another thread (henceforth called the processing thread) that serves one request in the above queue at a time. In configuration (b), the above policy is implemented in LGI similarly to the frequency control on laymen in law AP, while in configuration (a), M 's processing thread does some bookkeeping for the time of the most recent publication of each user, based on which each publication request is accepted or rejected. We decided on this implementation for (a), based on the assumption about a realistic access-control module that: (1) it would have to operate on the content of each message (not just on the frequency of all requests alone); and (2) it would not be implemented to have a single thread per user, due to rather large resource consumption. Also, in both configurations, informer x publishes event-notices to M -slowly enough not to cause any congestion-which are conveyed to subscriber y. When y receives each notification, it sends an acknowledgement (directly) to x. Some time after these agents start the communication, 28 s to be exact, a "roguish" agent r begins to publish as fast as it can (in effect, about 1500 publications per second). This publishing lasts 60 s. As an indicator for the latency between x and y, we measure the round-trip time (RTT) of each publication that starts when x publishes it, and ends when x receives y's acknowledgement.
Shown in Figure 7 is the result of this experiment. In the run for case (a), before r begins its publishing, the RTT remains stable at a few milliseconds. For the duration of r's publishing, the RTT increases linearly, as expected, up to about 15 s, by its end, nearly all of which is spent for the publication to wait in M 's queue. After r's publishing ends, it takes quite some time, more than 15 s, for the RTT to return to the normal, while M processes all publications accumulated in its queue.
In contrast, the graph for case (b) is fairly flat throughout, because r's publications are mostly captured by the controller that handles r, and does not transmit more than ten publications per second. Although in the graph it is indistinguishable, the RTT is slightly higher than the normal range of case (a), because of the larger latency under LGI, particularly within a LAN, where this experiment has been conducted (see Section 5.4).
Throughput of the mediation
As mentioned above, the LGI controller processes each regulated event in well below a millisecond. In the literature [3, 4] , it is suggested that, given thousands of subscriptions, the mediator would perform its matching algorithm in a few milliseconds on a comparable platform. Thus, if the controller runs on a separate host from the mediator's, it would not affect the throughput, i.e., the number of publications mediated per second. Moreover, under our mechanism, access-control related computation is carried out at the periphery, i.e., by the controllers associated with users, as depicted in Figure 5 . Since the mediator themselves have less to do per publication, their 
End-to-end latency
We compare the latency in propagating an authorized notice from informer x to subscriber y through mediator M , under no mediator congestion, in two cases: (a) the mediator providing access-control, and (b) each user and the mediator regulated by LGI. These two cases are depicted in Figure 8 , where T α,β stands for the time of communication between two processes α and β. ( will be explained shortly.) Letting T a and T b be the latency in cases (a) and (b), respectively, we consider the relative overhead (T b − T a )/T a , by following the general discussion in [14] . First, we consider a setting where both pairs (x, M ) and (M, y) are connected via WAN, while each controller is located in the same LAN as its client (though in a distinct host). Under this setting:
where T WAN is the TCP/IP communication time between two computational entities that reside in different LANs; we use as the time for computing the matching subscriptions, as well as that of the access-control (depicted inside the rectangle for M in Figure 8 ). Also:
where T LAN is the TCP/IP communication time between two entities that reside in the same LAN; we use the same as above for the time of event-evaluation by the LGI controller, as well. We assume T WAN , T LAN , and to be 100 ms, 1 ms, and 1 ms, respectively. This estimation of is made-given the above mentioned cost of event-evaluation by the LGI controller, and that of the matching indicated in the literature-under the assumption that the cost of the access-control would be roughly equivalent to that of LGI event-evaluation. The corresponding relative overhead is nearly equal to (3 + 4T LAN )/2T WAN since T WAN , which is about 0.03. This shows that, over the WAN, the latency increase due to our mechanism is negligible.
Second, we consider a setting where x, y, and M are all located within the same LAN, and, in case (b), each of them is associated with a controller in the same host. T WAN and T LAN in the above equations are replaced with T LAN and T pipe , respectively, where T pipe is the communication time via pipe, for two entities that reside on the same machine. We assume T pipe to be 0.1 ms . The corresponding relative overhead is (3 + 4T pipe )/2(T LAN + ), about 0.8, which we view as acceptable. This estimate has also been confirmed by measurements obtained in the experiment of Section 5.2.
Conclusion
Decoupled communication, which requires no direct association between the producers of information and its consumers-as practiced under the publish/subscribe (P/S) middleware, and under the tuple-space middleware-has emerged as an often useful element in the architecture of distributed and heterogeneous applications. But we maintain that this type of communication has a dark side: its indefinite, and potentially global, reach-the very reason for its power-may complicate the system using it, making it less predictable, more brittle, and less safe.
It is our thesis, however, that these drawbacks of decoupled communication can be alleviated effectively, efficiently, and scalably, by decentralized regulation of its use. Taking the P/S paradigm as the representative of what enables decoupled communication, we argued why such regulation does not lend itself to effective implementation by the P/S mediators. And we showed how it can be carried out by means of a distributed control mechanism called Law-Governed Interaction (LGI) [14] , along with the Moses middleware that implements it. We also demonstrated the importance of such regulation, and its efficacy, by means of a case study of the treatment of alarms, disseminated via a P/S middleware, in a large hospital.
